TWN 7
Bonn News Update
www.twn.my
Published by Third World Network
29 October 2014

Parties present proposals on enhancing pre-2020 ambition

Bonn, 29 Oct. (Indrajit Bose) – At the contact group meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) held on Oct. 24, two groups of countries presented their proposals on enhancing pre-2020 ambition, which is under workstream 2.

The two groups were the **Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC**) which had submitted a conference room paper (CRP), and the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),** which had made a submission in relation to workstream 2.

The contact group meeting began with Co-Chair Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) inviting the representatives of the LMDC and AOSIS to present their proposals and asked Parties to confine their discussions to these proposals.

Mali, speaking for the **African Group** said that the two proposals by the LMDC and AOSIS have a lot of convergence. While the proposal from AOSIS was greeted with positive reactions from developed countries, the LMDC proposal saw sharp reactions, especially on the implementation of decisions under the Bali Action Plan (BAP) and the Kyoto Protocol (KP). Several developed countries said that the pre-2020 ambition is limited only to mitigation and that the LMDC proposal went beyond the mandate of the Warsaw decision. Some developed countries said that work was already happening in relation to the BAP and the KP in other bodies of the Convention as well as in the Green Climate Fund.

Speaking for **LMDC, China** said its CRP called for the following key actions:

- The immediate and early ratification of the KP amendment for its second commitment period by the Parties listed in Annex B of the KP as well as other Parties;
- Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol unconditionally increasing in 2014 their mitigation targets, together with comparable increases in 2014 of the mitigation targets of those Annex I Parties who are not under the KP, to at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, together with the development of needed arrangements, such as modalities, timelines and organization of the work, for revisiting and increasing in 2014 such mitigation targets by both sets of Annex I Parties. The use of the KP's flexibility mechanisms will be allowed only for those Annex I Parties that ratify the Doha Amendment to the KP.
- Clear commitments from Annex II Parties for the provision of financing in the pre-2020 period through the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) and other mechanisms, including the Convention's financial mechanism, to support developing countries' national adaptation actions including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Developing countries should be supported in identifying further activities, barriers and their finance needs for adaptation, enhancing resilience and promoting economic diversification.
- Parties must address the economic and social consequences of the implementation

of response measures on developing countries;

- The rapid and substantial capitalization of the Green Climate Fund (GCF);
- Annex II Parties having clear commitments with an agreed pathway to providing new, additional, and sufficient public climate finance of US $70 billion by 2016, US $85 billion by 2018, and US $100 billion by 2020, through the Convention's financial mechanism, particularly the GCF. There must be a 2015-2020 work programme on the review of the adequacy of the commitments on financial support by developed countries as well as the implementation of these commitments, to be launched in 2015 and informed by the MRV (measurement-reporting-verification) of finance support and the work under the existing financial mechanism.
- Progress towards having operational modalities by Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice's (SBSTA's) 42nd session for the work of the Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Centre and Network to ensure accelerated technology transfer to developing countries, including addressing the issue of intellectual property rights and enhancing the provision and MRV of financial support on technology development and transfer in developing countries through dedicated work programmes for these issues to be launched in 2015 and running up to 2020.
- Have the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) and SBSTA help Parties in addressing the adverse economic and social consequences of the implementation of response measures on developing countries, including through the conduct of research and the production of technical papers by the Secretariat on this issue.

China also suggested having an accelerated implementation mechanism under the ADP. This is a mechanism that will seek to accelerate implementation of enhanced ambition pre-2020 through matching and mobilizing political engagement together with the technical work under the technical expert meetings (TEMs). "The proposal by the African Group on workstream 2 also contains ideas that we would support in this regard. This accelerated implementation mechanism should operationalize the Revisit Mechanism in paragraph 4(b) and (c) of decision 1/CP.19 to ensure that there is a constant review and ratcheting up of developed country mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 period," said China.

China proposed the launch of two work programmes from 2015 to 2020: one on the review of the adequacy of pre-2020 finance, technology and capacity building support by developed countries; and another on the further identification of the further measures, policies and actions on provision of finance and technology support by developed countries, including the additional numbers of the finance targets by 2020 and a technology inventory based on developing countries' needs for further action.

China suggested having the Secretariat continue arranging for additional TEMs to be held during the sessions of the ADP in 2015, focusing on options for actions to unlock the mitigation potential of all developed countries, enhance actions on adaptation, and increase the provision of finance, technology and capacity building support to developing country Parties, as well as removing barriers to action by developed countries. This, it said, ties in very well with the proposal from the African Group for the identification of developing countries' relevant technical and financial needs, gaps and constraints, with a view to filling the implementation gap with additional support from developed countries.

(Paragraph 3 of the Warsaw decision reads: *Resolves to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (BAP),1 in particular in relation to the provision of means of implementation, including technology, finance and capacity building support for developing country Parties, recognizing that such implementation will enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period*; Paragraph 4 of the Warsaw decision reads: *Also resolves to enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties by:*

(a) Urging each Party that has not yet communicated a quantified economy-wide emission reduction target or nationally appropriate mitigation action, as applicable, to do so;

(b) Urging each developed country Party to implement without delay its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the Convention and, if it is also a Party to the KP, its quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second commitment period of the KP, if applicable;

(c) Urging each developed country Party to revisit its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the Convention and, if it is also a Party to the KP, its quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second commitment period of the KP, if applicable, in accordance with decision 1/CMP.8, paragraphs 7–11;

(d) Urging each developed country Party to periodically evaluate the continuing application of any conditions associated with its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target, with a view to adjusting, resolving or removing such conditions;

(e) Urging developed country Parties to increase technology, finance and capacity-building support to enable increased mitigation ambition by developing country Parties;

(f) Urging each developing country Party that has communicated its nationally appropriate mitigation action to implement it and, where appropriate, consider further action, recognizing that nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be taken in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, finance and capacity-building.)

Speaking for **AOSIS, Nauru** said it had made a submission and that it is in line with paragraph 5 of the Warsaw decision. (Paragraph 5 of the decision is about *'accelerating activities on enhancing mitigation ambition by intensifying the technical examination of opportunities for actions with high mitigation potential, including those with adaptation and sustainable development co-benefits*; *facilitating the sharing of experiences and best practices among Parties; promoting voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions; and considering further activities to be undertaken under that workplan at COP 20*).

Nauru said its proposal focuses on enhanced work plan for action; contains a number of suggestions related to TEMs; updating technology papers following a TEM; invites submissions from subnational authorities, international organizations, civil society and private sector entities; encourages Parties and expert organizations hosting non-UNFCCC events to submit relevant information on the outcomes; speaks to political engagement and organizing high level mitigation action ministerials; and asks the Secretariat and bodies of the Convention, such as the subsidiary bodies, GCF, Standing Committee on Finance, Global Environment Facility, Technology Executive Committee, Climate Technology Centre and Network to liaise with Parties to facilitate implementation of policy options.

Mali, speaking for the **African Group** said that the TEMs have tried to identify limitations and gaps. Referring to the participation of institutions in the TEMs and making reports, the challenge remains on how to "accelerate the accelerators". It expressed concerns that Parties were not going at a speed that is fast enough. Mali also said that the two proposals by the LMDC and AOSIS have a lot of convergence, central to which is a commitment to close the gap. It said that while the AOSIS proposal calls for activities, the LMDC proposal calls for a mechanism for action that could be achieved by identifying concrete measures. It added that it is important to strengthen the work plan and take policy options to the next step. It said that irrespective of how much Parties may prefer TEMs, ambition would not come out of them unless Parties decide to take action. Ambition will not come from the World Bank or International Finance Corporation or the International Renewable Energy Agency. Developed country Parties have to come to the TEM and say what they will do, it said. "If we are not doing that, we are exhausting the value of the TEM," it said.

Speaking for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Costa Rica** said that it is critical that developed countries take the lead in implementing their mitigation commitments in line with what is required by science. It also called for developed countries to increase finance, technology and capacity building support. It called for continuation of TEMs with increased focus on implementation.

Bolivia focused its intervention on TEMs. It said that it is important to continue with additional TEMs and focus on options for actions to unlock the mitigation potential of all developed country Parties, enhance actions on adaptation, and on increasing the provision of finance, technology and capacity building support to developing country Parties. It was concerned about the approach of the TEMs being oriented to facilitate and share information from technologies developed by large private companies and transnationals, strengthening public-private sector partnerships, and the use of foreign technologies for specific local needs in adaptation in developing countries. "The approach is mostly that countries from the North have the technologies and capabilities and that the countries and peoples from the South should get access to such technologies and knowledge based on diversity of incentives and also through the articulation of the supply and demand of technologies," it said.

Bolivia added that what is still missing in the general debate on enhancing mitigation and adaptation ambition are the actions of indigenous, local communities and local peoples. "In this regard, indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and practices, including indigenous peoples' holistic view of community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to climate change, but these have not been used consistently in existing mitigation and adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge with existing practices increases the effectiveness of adaptation," it said.

Bolivia accordingly called for a new topic to be introduced in relation to the TEMs at COP20 in Lima on "technologies, knowledge systems and practices from indigenous peoples, local communities and local resource users for enhancing mitigation and adaptation".

Venezuela said that it was very uncomfortable with the "mish-mash" of sub-national, private sector etc. to set ambitious goals and scale up their actions to assist Parties to achieve an emissions pathway consistent with limiting global average temperature rise, when this was the role of national governments.

Brazil questioned if the vision of work under workstream 2 is to flow into the 2015 agreement or if it is meant to be kept as a separate track alongside the agreement. It added that a diversity of policy options make the TEMs exercise useful.

Appreciating the role of TEMs, **South Africa** reiterated that the dimension of implementation has been neglected in discussions. Giving detailed comments on the Co-chairs' draft text, it sought clarity on the kind of outcomes Parties must adopt in Lima. It stressed on the importance of international cooperation initiatives and called for reporting guidelines for them. It called on the Co-Chairs to provide a reworked version of their draft text.

The **European Union** said there is no scope to widen the mandate of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Warsaw decision. On TEMs, the EU said while they are useful, there is no need to be prescriptive. It supported the AOSIS proposal to better capture the output of TEMs. It asked Parties to exercise caution over burdening the Secretariat.

Norway said that the TEMs have been useful for sharing mitigation action and that they should continue in 2015. It called for future TEMs on renewable energy, energy efficiency, short lived climate forcers, fossil fuel subsidies and carbon capture and storage and said the scope of the future TEMs could be narrowed down. Referring to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Warsaw decision, it said the LMDC proposal goes beyond the mandate of the two paragraphs since adaptation does not figure in the mandate. It asked the Co-Chairs to present a revised version of the draft text.

Switzerland said the focus of the TEMs has to be on mitigation action. It called for a range of actors to participate in the TEMs process. It supported AOSIS's view on Convention's bodies to engage with TEMs. It also said that while the engagement of ministers in worksteam 2 is beneficial, they need to do more than just read statements, and play an active role and take decisions. They can strengthen cooperation and engage in new partnerships and mobilise resources. It added that it is ready to engage with the draft text prepared by the Co-Chairs.

Canada said that the Durban mandate was to close the ambition gap through the mitigation effort by all Parties. It supported the AOSIS proposal, especially on TEMs, and said it had potential for high mitigation for both developed and developing countries. On the LMDC proposal, it said that it would significantly limit reducing the ambition gap "collectively" and asked of the Co-Chairs to come up with a new version of their text.

Japan said that closing the mitigation gap is a continuous effort and that focusing on mitigation technology would be key. It supported the AOSIS proposal and said that it can be a good addition to the draft prepared by Co-chairs. It did not support the LMDC proposal and said that there is a lot of work happening in other bodies on enhancing mitigation and finance and therefore, these issues should not be taken up under workstream 2.

Australia said Parties need to stay true to the purpose of workstream 2 and should focus on highest mitigation potential, enhancing synergies, making the TEMs more focused. It said it cannot support the LMDC proposal and it would not support new submissions under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Warsaw decision. It also called for a revised draft text by the Co-Chairs.

New Zealand said it is important to respect the mandate of workstream 2 and that the LMDC proposal goes beyond the scope of that mandate. "Implementation of BAP strays beyond workstream 2 and is happening elsewhere. We should not have to address it here," it said. It asked of the Co-Chairs to produce another draft text.

The United States said that the LMDC proposal would push Parties away from the mandate and that the mandate should not be renegotiated. It added that discussions on paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Warsaw decision are taking place in various bodies within and outside of the Convention, including in the GCF in relation to finance. It referred to TEMs as a useful model to catalyse ambition and said it looked forward to the Co-chairs revising the draft text.

In response to the comments on the LMDC proposal, **China** said it is clear that pre-2020 ambition is not limited to mitigation; it is for all the elements of the BAP. Implementation of BAP outcome is the fundamental basis to raise the pre-2020 levels and the two cannot be separated, it said. On TEMs, it said that they are useful and they point to the need of improvement in a lot of areas and future TEMs should focus on the mitigation potential of developed countries and how to increase financial ambition. It also called for the need to generate political engagement of the outcomes from TEMs and to link them to action. "You cannot leave this outcome to ministers. There has to be something in between," said China. "We need to build further ground on political engagement. We need to have some institutional arrangements," it said.

Referring to comments that the LMDC proposal expects only developed countries to take action, China clarified that that is not true. The LMDC proposal also talks of how through increased support, developing countries can be enabled to do more on mitigation and adaptation.

In response to Parties, **Nauru** said there should be a decision in Lima that should give continuity to the workstream 2 process. It also said that Parties could land a mandate for the continued work of the TEMs in Lima. It supported the TEM option proposed by Bolivia and suggested there be a TEM on transport. It expressed caution over the quantity of TEMs and said that for quality, one would have to sacrifice quantity. It looked forward to a revised text from the Co-Chairs, which would incorporate the comments received on its proposal.

Following the session, the Co-Chairs on 24 October, produced a revised draft text entitled 'accelerating the implementation of enhanced pre-2020 climate action', for the consideration of Parties in Lima, in December 2014.

(Edited by Meena Raman.)