

ADP: Backsliding in emissions commitments “destructive to negotiations”

Warsaw, 18 Nov (Anjali Appadurai) – Backsliding by some developed countries in reducing greenhouse gases emission will be “destructive” to the ongoing negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Japan's recent announcement of its new emissions targets for 2020, which would allow emissions to increase by 3.1 percent has been described by China as "destructive to our negotiations" in the Warsaw meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action (ADP). (Japan has announced that it is reducing its emissions by 3.8% from its 2005 level but this is actually an increase of 3.1% from 1990 levels, the base line for the Convention. Previously, it had pledged reductions of 25% by 2020 based on its 1990 level.)

Over the past week, developing countries led by the **Group of 77** and **China** continued to demand leadership, ambition and implementation by developed countries in a concrete outcome from Workstream 2 of the ADP that deals with the pre-2020 ambition.. India said Parties have to ask ourselves whether we see this COP as a “holding” COP to put ambition on hold or an “implementation” COP to enhance ambition.

The ADP's Co-chairs, Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) and Artur Runge-Metzger (the European Union) structured the work of Workstream 2 (WS2) by convening a series of three open-ended consultations on possible outcomes for WS2 by the end of Warsaw and beyond. Metzger urged Parties to treat the consultations as a "decision time" and to come up with a concrete path forward. (Workstream 1 addresses the agreement for the post-2020 timeframe.)

At the first meeting on 13 Nov the Secretariat made a presentation summarizing a technical paper on the “Compilation of information on the mitigation benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation ambition.” The other two consultations took place on 15 and 16 November. The Co-chairs asked Parties to consider two guiding questions that were: (i) what outcome do Parties expect to achieve as an outcome under WS2 in Warsaw; and (ii) what are practical solutions and specific proposals suggested by Parties for catalyzing action before 2020?

Following the interventions by Parties, on Saturday, 16 Nov, Metzger said the work of WS2 could be advanced in four "blocks" which are: (i) principles and provisions of the Convention; (ii) implementation; (iii) ambition and (iv) specific initiatives.

Developing countries, led by the **G77** and **China** made strong calls for more ambition, a comprehensive approach, and immediate implementation of existing commitments under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. Below are the highlights of the issues raised by groupings of Parties and individual Parties over the three consultations.

Malaysia speaking for the **G77** and **China** called for developed countries to take the lead on closing the various gaps in the work of the ADP, reiterating that WS2 must be driven by the findings of the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and must proceed with the urgency required by the science to keep warming well below 2 degrees Celsius. It reminded Parties that WS2 must deliver pre-2020 ambition on all fronts, and must do so immediately. It also stressed that work under the ADP must proceed within the

Convention as much as possible. Any work that must be taken outside the Convention must be underpinned by the same principles of the Convention, namely historical responsibility, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capacity.

G77/China consistently called on Parties to address the “ambition gap.” It called for greater ambition across the board, but especially in the context of (a) mitigation by developed countries, (b) finance commitments by developed countries, and (c) implementation of existing mechanisms and programmes. These demands were echoed in separate statements by many of the G77 members, including **China, India, Columbia, Brazil, South Africa, Bolivia, Ecuador, Micronesia, Kuwait, Pakistan and Algeria.**

In the context of developed country mitigation, G77/China urged Parties to take immediate action on ratifying the Doha Amendments to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This was also supported by **China, India, South Africa, Bolivia, Ecuador, Philippines, Vietnam, and Venezuela**, among others. The Group reminded Parties that there is a 2014 “ambition mechanism” in the Protocol for the raising the ambition, but that this mechanism will only remain relevant once the Doha Amendments are ratified.

G77/China made clear demands in the areas of finance, technology transfer and means of implementation. It called for technology transfer to be supported with capacity-building, and for barriers to technology transfer to be removed. Several other developing countries, including **Iran, China, Belarus and Vietnam** also mentioned capacity-building as parts of their expected outcomes for WS2.

The Group also called for the immediate securing of funds from Fast Start Finance and the GCF (Green Climate Fund). It called for clarity on the 2013-2020 period, asking for a clear pathway to scale up finance during this period, as well as clear and predictable financial flows. Practical avenues for quick action included the voluntary cancellation of CERs (certified emissions reductions). It also called for the establishment of a mechanism that could match developing country mitigation and adaptation proposals with finance and technology.

Annex I Parties need to increase their mitigation ambition in a comparable manner within the same time frame. All Annex I Parties must undertake

additional verifiable actions under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as under the Convention with a view to close the ambition gap by 2020. The enhanced commitments from Annex I Parties in 2014 for the pre-2020 period should be the first step since this would directly impact the level of ambition in work-stream 1 for the post-2020 period. It ended by stating that 2020 is not the deadline for implementing WS2. It must be implemented as soon as possible, and with the utmost urgency.

Nauru for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) also stated the need to close the ambition gap. It emphasized that WS2 was of utmost importance to developing countries. It was only because of WS2 that developing countries in Doha agreed to the 2015 agreement not coming into effect until 2020.

As mandated by the decisions in Durban, AOSIS had developed a proposal for the way forward on WS2. It proposed a “solutions-oriented technical process” that would focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency. The process would consist of 3 components, each focusing on an aspect of renewable energy and energy efficiency: submissions from Parties and observers containing best practices; technical papers focusing on the costs and benefits of mitigation and barriers to mitigation; and expert workshops with the involvement of national, sub-national and local governments as well as civil society. The process would develop scalable pilot projects that Nauru requested be discussed at the next June ADP session (in 2014), then compiled into mitigation action plans to be forwarded to the UN Climate Summit in 2014. AOSIS stressed that this proposed technical process should not lead to binding mitigation targets for developing countries. It hoped that the Chair would include the proposal in the document to be forwarded from the ADP to the Conference of the Parties. The proposal was supported by **Palau, Norway, New Zealand, and Micronesia.**

With regards to a concrete outcome for WS2 under the ADP, Nauru said that AOSIS wants the highest possible mitigation effort from all Parties to get below AOSIS’ agreed 1.5 degree Celsius target.

Venezuela for the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) at the 15 November consultation reiterated its call for the urgent implementation of the needed pre-2020 enhanced actions in the context of WS2 in order to lay down a strong, solid, and ambitious basis for

enhanced post-2020 ambition under Workstream 1. The LMDC set out its elements for the outcome under WS2 as follows:

1. The immediate and early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol amendment for its second commitment period by the Parties listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol as well as other Parties;
2. Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol unconditionally increasing in 2014 their mitigation targets, together with comparable increases in 2014 of the mitigation targets of those Annex I Parties who are not under the Kyoto Protocol, to at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, together with the development of needed arrangements, such as modalities, timelines and organization of the work, for revisiting and increasing in 2014 such mitigation targets by both sets of Annex I Parties;
3. Clear commitments from Annex II Parties for the provision of financing in the pre-2020 period through the Cancun Adaptation Framework and other mechanisms, including the Convention's financial mechanism, to support developing countries' national adaptation actions including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Developing countries should be supported in identifying further activities, barriers and their finance needs for adaptation, enhancing resilience and promoting economic diversification.
4. Parties must address the economic and social consequences of the implementation of response measures on developing countries;
5. The rapid and substantial capitalization and operationalization of the Green Climate Fund;
6. Annex II Parties having clear commitments with an agreed pathway to providing new, additional, and sufficient public climate finance during the period 2014 to 2020 through the Convention's financial mechanism, particularly the GCF, in order to meet the goal of providing US\$100 billion dollars per year by 2020, including the source, the amounts, the timelines, and the financing pathway. There must be a 2014-2020 work programme on the review of the adequacy of the commitments on financial support by developed countries as well as the

implementation of these commitments, to be launched in 2014 and informed by the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of finance support and the work under the existing Financial Mechanism.

7. Progress towards having operational modalities as soon as possible through the work of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) to ensure accelerated technology transfer to developing countries, including addressing the issue of intellectual property rights and enhancing the provision and MRV of financial support on technology development and transfer in developing countries through dedicated work programmes for these issues to be launched in 2014 and running up to 2020.

On nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing countries in the pre-2020 period, the LMDC developing countries have already shown their willingness and leadership by putting them forward that showed more mitigation ambition in aggregate than the combined mitigation commitments of Annex I Parties. Any further actions on mitigation by developing countries are premised on the enhanced provision of finance, technology and capacity building support by developed countries beyond their current finance, technology and capacity building commitments pursuant to the Bali Road Map.

In an earlier intervention on 13 Nov, Venezuela also on behalf of the LMDC said that the issues being discussed were more political than technical. Being practical, it questioned why there was a pre-2020 gap in the first place, if science and commitments are already on the table. It further pointed out that there are initiatives that exist under the Convention that could deliver science-based results, but the work of the ADP should examine which ones could apply for the 2015 agreement and pre-2020 period, and how to operationalize them. For example, with regards to solutions for energy efficiency, it mentioned the "no regrets" option, which it stated would be politically easy to pass. With regards to technology transfer and development, it pointed out that there was some progress in this area, but that transfer of appropriate technologies would have to be re-examined. It urged Parties not to go down the path of Copenhagen (COP meeting in

2009) next September leading up to the UN Climate Summit and to COP20.

Nepal, speaking for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** referred to the recently released UNEP Gap Report announced that there is a substantive gap between emissions reduction pledges and the required pathway to keeping warming below 2 degrees. It reminded Parties that the further down this pathway we go, the narrower the options will get. Further reports state that many LDCs will experience significant impacts before even 1 degree of warming. The LDCs believe that the main focus of WS2 is to reduce this gap in order to get on a pathway to 1.5 degrees or less of warming. It pointed out that tightening up the rules and implementing unconditional pledges could bring the global community halfway to closing the gap. More development and transfer of clean technologies and fossil fuel subsidy reform could close the gap even more. Because of this, it stressed that progress on WS2 is closely related to progress on finance. It made a strong call for sufficient finance for those who need it the most. Finally, Nepal for LDCs reminded Parties that the science shows that meeting the 2020 goal is still possible, but the opportunity is narrowing.

Mali for the **African Group** stated that the pre-2020 gap is a "credibility test": if Parties are not able to solve the exercise of closing the pre-2020 ambition gap, then the whole idea of a platform for enhanced action would sound awkward. It further stressed that closing the ambition gap is as much an adaptation gap as a mitigation one. It further stated that the African Group had collaborated with other Parties to identify a course of action which included the ratchet mechanism for raising ambition under the Doha Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol. It underscored the need for visible, clear and concrete mobilization of the \$100 billion finance target to enable and unlock mitigation potential. It expressed interest in working on initiatives and proposals, and stated that it was in the process of consulting other Parties regarding this.

Colombia spoke for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, saying its focus was the mitigation gap. It urged Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the 2 degree Celsius target. It stressed that global emissions must peak by 2015, and the lower-end scenario of warming as presented by the IPCC is the only scenario that would be acceptable to the AILAC countries. It also called for increased

ambition on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus). It called for a dedicated pre-2020 Ministerial session on ambition as well as expert workshops in June (2014).

Cameroon spoke for the **Congo Basin Countries (COMIFAC)**, stressed that the 1.5 degree target is the only acceptable option for African countries. It stated that it has put effort into sustainable management of forests and ecosystems, since science shows that limiting deforestation can significantly contribute to closing the gigatonne gap. It requested that WS2 integrate REDD-plus into the solution for closing the gigatonne gap, but reminded Parties that even if the REDD-plus mechanism were fully implemented in developing countries, it would still not be sufficient to meet emissions reduction targets. It stressed that developed countries must raise their ambition level.

China set out a detailed pre-2020 agenda and strongly called into question the leadership showed by developed countries. (The issue of leadership was also supported by **Swaziland**, **Kuwait**, **the Philippines**, and other developing countries). China pointed out that the EU had only committed to reduced emissions by 18% below 1990 levels, when it had already achieved that target last year, and was puzzled why it did not commit to more ambitious targets. It also strongly criticized Japan's recent announcement of its new emissions targets for 2020, which would allow emissions to increase by 3 percent. China called this announcement "destructive to our negotiations." It asked if this showed ambition.

It stated that the pre-2020 mitigation gap would not exist if developed countries had committed to 40 per cent reductions below 1990 levels; therefore it sees that the ambition gap in WS2 is to be filled by greater commitments from developed countries. It called for true leadership from the developed countries in the area of mitigation commitments, stating strongly that increasing pre-2020 ambition will be achieved only through implementation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan (BAP) outcome.

In addressing the second question (practical solutions), China stated that WS2 should become comprehensive, and cover all pillars of the ADP. It strongly emphasized the need for the work of the ADP and of WS2 to be guided by the BAP, which means that the workplan on pre-2020 ambition should reflect the differentiation and

distinction contained in the BAP between developed and developing countries.

China urged ratification of the Doha Amendments no later than 2014. If Parties cannot meet this deadline, it stated that they should be required to provide an explanation. Parties already taking part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP 2CP) should revisit their commitments and targets by December 2014 and significantly increase their quantified emissions reduction targets (QERTs) as agreed in the Doha Amendment. Parties not currently taking part in KP 2CP should immediately raise their ambition for comparable commitments without conditionality, by 2014 at the latest. As a necessary first step, they would have to make comparable QERTs under the Convention equating to at least 28 per cent below 1990 levels, to be increased to the upper range of 25-40 per cent as required by the IPCC by the following year.

It stated that developing countries have done proportionally more mitigation than developed countries. The provision of finance and technology will enable developing countries to undertake their nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs). With regards to finance, China stressed the need for enhanced commitments from developed countries not only for mitigation finance, but also for adaptation finance.

On technology, China highlighted the need for the implementation or operationalization of existing mechanisms related to technology transfer under the Convention. The Convention's Technology Mechanism, consisting of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Center and Network, is not enough to ensure technology transfer. It suggested adding a specific Work Programme on resolving finance and technology issues. The measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) element of this is very important.

Bolivia said that the developed country Parties not in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol account for 64 per cent of developed country emissions. This translates to 10.9 gigatonnes of greenhouse gases not accounted for. It further stated that the pre-2020 ambition could not be addressed only through mitigation, but must be addressed through adaptation, technology transfer, capacity-building and support. It called for Parties' commitment to the implementation gap, which is closely linked with the ambition gap. There are also gaps in areas of equitable access to sustainable development.

The Philippines called on all to pursue an emergency climate pathway where developed countries must take the lead. We hear about the talk of the ambition gap. But there is another gap that we must take to heart and that is the implementation gap. The pre-2020 ambition must be addressed in a comprehensive manner, covering mitigation, adaptation and finance and technology support. It made similar calls as the LMDC. Developing nations require significantly increased support from developed countries — especially those historically responsible for climate change. It said further that addressing three key finance issues, not just in the context of this current session in Warsaw, but also in the context of WS2, will help secure climate action in both developed and developing nations. These critical steps include: a commitment to rapidly scale up adaptation finance, because there is no mitigation without adaptation for developing countries; and move the work forward on institutional arrangements for the mechanism to address loss and damage; providing further clarity on pathways to secure the commitment of \$100 billion a year by 2020; and infusing momentum into making the GCF operational. The first exercise in raising global mitigation ambition both in the pre-2020 (and post-2020) timeframes includes getting a specific commitment from developed countries with respect to climate financing flows during the mid-term (2013-2020) and the long term (post-2020).

Brazil had submitted two proposals aimed at increasing ambition and catalyzing action under WS2: the first involved providing visibility to the Executive Board of the CDM for voluntary cancellation of credits, which would benefit the Adaptation Fund since it relies on CDM revenues; the second was an "early action" proposal, involving providing incentives to countries to raise ambition before 2020.

China, India and Bolivia brought up the issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as barriers to technology transfer. **China** proposed an international institution on climate-related IPRs to be launched in Lima as a way to address IPRs. **Bolivia** also brought up the issue of loss and damage and called upon Parties to consider finance for loss and damage as an important part of the WS2 outcome.

The **European Union** also referred to the UNEP Gap Report which identified several gaps in relation to emissions reductions. It said that sometimes, the politics of ambition is better

outside the Convention rather than inside because there are many benefits and co-benefits which it would like to see continue to provide the catalytic effect. On the specific outcomes, it wanted an action agenda. It suggested a mandate for technical analysis; arrangements for the recognition of initiatives and partnerships for accelerating ambition. It also supported the catalytic role of the Montreal Protocol which does not involve the transfer of responsibilities to developing countries but the sharing of it. It also supported the calls for advancing the implementation agenda on adaptation, finance and technology. It wanted Warsaw to be remembered as one that enabled ambition and not where existing commitments and pledges for emissions reductions reduced (in an apparent reference to Japan.)

Australia, supported by **New Zealand**, **Canada**, and the **USA**, called for all Parties who did not make binding pledges as part of the Copenhagen process to do so. **Mexico** highlighted short-lived climate pollutants as an area of opportunity for WS2. It stated that addressing these pollutants, which include black carbon and other substances, could have significant co-benefits for public health.

Australia, **New Zealand**, **USA**, the **EU**, **Canada** and **Micronesia** all expressed support for a proposal to reduce HFC (hydrofluorocarbon) emissions through the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The US stated that addressing HFCs through the Montreal Protocol could remove 90 gigatonnes of GHGs from the atmosphere.

Several developing countries, including the **Venezuela for the LMDC**, **China**, **India**, **Saudi Arabia** and **Pakistan**, strongly disagreed, stating individually that HFCs are not an ozone-depleting substance, but a GHG, and should be addressed through the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

The LMDC stressed that any initiatives in relation to HFCs have to be addressed through all relevant multilateral fora in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, taking into account the availability of safe and technically and economically viable alternatives. It is essential that developed countries make clear commitments on new and additional financial resources to support developing countries to address the HFCs issue.

India pointed out that at a recent meeting of the Montreal Protocol in Bangkok, there was disagreement among several Parties to a proposal to shift HFCs to the remit of the Protocol. HFCs belong here in the UNFCCC. It should be treated in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention. It is not enough to account for it under UNFCCC. In fact, it would not be correct to account under the Convention for anything done outside the Convention. That would be having the cake and eating it too.

On the issue of International Cooperation Initiatives (ICIs), **Australia**, **New Zealand** and **the USA** spoke about the potential for emissions reductions coming from ICI proposals. New Zealand proposed a work plan for realizing ICI potential.

The LMDC disagreed, stating that any discussion on ICIs must be in accordance with the principles and provision of the Convention, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, as well as based on the differentiation between developed and developing countries. A key consideration is the need to ensure that these initiatives continue to reflect the need for developed countries to show more mitigation ambition and take the lead rather than shift the mitigation responsibility to developing countries. Doing otherwise will only distract Parties from effectively concluding their work under WS2 and will lead to a weak and unambitious outcome on the various elements of WS2.

India was strongly opposed to including ICIs in the mandate of WS2 or the UNFCCC at all. It stressed that ICIs are part of national action, and should remain as such. It stipulated that if ICIs were to be brought under the Convention, they would have to abide by the principles of the Convention, and moreover, would have to be funded in order to be effective. Additionally, India raised the concern that ICIs outside the Convention ran the risk of only addressing certain aspects of the Convention while ignoring others. It also warned against allowing discussion of ICIs to sidetrack more important discussions under WS2. The ICI discussion is part of a broader question of what extent institutions and programmes outside the UNFCCC should be involved in helping countries meet their targets.

India stressed that in an atmosphere where Annex I Parties not only have low ambition, but their ambition is getting progressively lower and lower as days go by, we cannot be side-tracked by

promises of ICIs, completely ignoring the main-track, which is the implementation of decisions and enhancement of ambition in accordance with the decisions taken. Shifting the responsibility on the developing countries in Work Stream 2 is not the answer.

It added that getting fixated on mitigation only, without increasing ambition in the other elements in the Convention is actually counterproductive in ensuring ambition in the pre-2020 period. For e.g, under ICI, if renewable energy is taken up, how will it happen without technology transfer? What happens to capacity building to absorb it? Where is finance? Will it assist adaptation? How will IPRs be addressed? Answering these questions will help mitigation. If the ambition in these related areas are not increased, then ICIs will be mere business proposition for private sector from Annex I countries. We are not here for business. We are here to implement the Convention and enhance ambition to combat climate change.

The **USA, Australia** and **New Zealand** supported the idea of including outside initiatives in the mandate of the UNFCCC. The USA and Australia mentioned the Clean Air Coalition as an example of a positive actions by outside institutions. **Mexico** also expressed support for looking outside the UNFCCC.

Switzerland called on all Parties that had not made mitigation pledges to do so. It welcomed the AOSIS proposal for focused expert meetings and high level engagement where all contribute to an upward spiral in ambition. It did not want the work in WS2 to duplicate what is going on in the other parts of the Convention process.

Canada called for the broad participation of all Parties to close the gap and enhance mitigation ambition through effective engagement of all emitters. It cited many initiatives outside and within the Convention including on addressing short-lived climate pollutants, the Major Economies Forum and the HFC phase down.